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to have unrestricted operation in conflict of laws, and the author's proposal
to restrict it only by the conception of public policy is too vague to serve as
more than a stopgap until more definite restrictions can be developed.,
There are matters of contract law, however, on which the intention of
the parties may well be dominant. These are the matters which determine the
scope and content of the contractual obligation and which the parties had the
power to determine for themselves. They include, for example, whether
there are warranties, who shall run the risk of loss from the action of third
parties, and what will justify termination. If the parties could have dealt
with them explicitly in detail, there is no reason why they may not deal with
them indirectly by reference to a particular system of law. This is no more
than filling gaps in the contractual plan. It is a different thing, especially
when the parties are of unequal bargaining power, to seek to escape from pro-
tective rules which prevent the making of a contract at all, as rules about
capacity. And if the normally applicable rules on the content of the contrac-
tual obligation do not merely fill a gap in the contractual plan but are pro-
tective and mandatory, as rules on the limitation of liability of carriers, they
too should not be evaded by the facile device of an expressed intent to use
another law.
In torts the author would give more weight to the law of the place where
the injury was suffered than would some other writers who have considered the
subject.9
The chapters on corporations and kindred organizations were most help-
ful to me in the analysis of the types of legal persons and the varieties of un-
incorporated associations; in the discussion of the law governing corporate
activities; and in the reminder that, where the common law uses the contacts
of place of incorporation and doing business, the civil law is apt to use center
of administration and the establishment of a place of business.
I feel like expressing appreciation as well as congratulations to the Uni-
versity of Michigan and the foundations which made possible the necessary
research to produce this latest addition to the Michigan Legal Studies, and to
Messrs. James, Long, Sirene, Hancock, Coffey and others in the University of
Michigan Law School and elsewhere who aided Dr. Rabel and to whom the
author states his indebtedness.
ELLIOTT E. CHEATHAM
Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
CRIMINAL LAW, ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC ORDER. By George H.
Dession. Charlottesville: Michie Casebook Corporation, 1948. Pp. viii,1081. $8.75.
In reviewing a casebook the reviewer is necessarily more closely confined
to an analysis of the material and its arrangement than in a review of, say, a
textbook, where it is possible to trace the wide sweep of the subject's develop-
ment. This review will, therefore, consist, in the main, of an examination,
chapter by chapter, of the contents of Mr. Dession's book, followed by some
brief general comments.
Chapter I deals with the broad problem, what sort or sorts of conduct
8. For a criticism of the wide use of public policy in conflict of laws, see Goodrich,
Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. REv. 26 (1938).
9. Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law. 19 Tulane
L. Rev. 165 (1944). Cf. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLIcr OF LAws 182-187 (1937).
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deemed socially undesirable should be placed within the purview of criminal
law. The editor takes for granted the inclusion of all the usual attacks on
personal and property safety, and addresses himself to the borderline material,
much of it very recent in development. Thus, for example, birth control and
combinations in restraint of trade both find places here. In other words, the
chapter deals with what Mannheim in his recent study1 has called the "values"
that criminal law protects. Like Mannheim, Mr. Dession brings out the
fact that these values tend to change far more from generation to generation
than a short-range view would indicate. Blasphemy has lost its "value";
wild-cat stock issuance has gained one. It is interesting to note that (if the
selection of cases is a criterion) Mr. Dession does not share Mannheim's ex-
aggerated fear of "white-collar" crime. At any rate the chapter contains no
case on tax-evasion-a matter that, to the European author, apparently seems
almost the wave of the future.
Chapter II takes up various disagreeable or otherwise unwanted ex-
periences to which the individual is subjected, and examines to what extent
they may be justified either (a) as further punishments or collateral conse-
quences of a conviction, or (b) as devices of social protection against one not
regarded as a criminal. Thus, as part of the former group, there is valuable
material on the consequences of being placed on probation, a court's power
to impose fines and to implement them by imprisonment and the severer
treatment of recidivists. One would expect at this point to find a discussion
of "cruel and unusual punishment" and of the degree to which we are tied
down by that constitutional limitation to a set and narrow range of punish-
ment and rehabilitative treatment. The entire absence of such discussion
seems unfortunate. The second category (devices of social protection against
non-criminals) discusses, besides the obvious illustration of commitment to a
reformatory by a juvenile court, the imposition of quarantine regulations, the
confiscation of property used in committing a crime, the exclusion of the
Nisei from the Pacific Coast during the recent war, compulsory sterilization
laws, and-especially interesting-the "sexual psychopathic person" statutes
recently enacted by a number of states.
Chapter III in its opening section takes up the policy considerations in-
volved in determining whether the criminal law should or should not con-
cern itself with various sorts of conduct. It deals with such questions as the
extent to which the criminality of homicide or physical violence should be
affected by motives of self-preservation. Other policy problems brought up
in this section are the degree of definiteness which statutes should be required
to attain (e.g., their use of such terms as "disorderly conduct," "vagrancy,"
etc.) and the conflict between criminal law and freedom of speech and publica-
tion. The final two sections of this chapter deal briefly with the purposes of
punishment, vengeance, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc. In the reviewer's
opinion not only are they injected at an unexpected moment, but also they
should either have received more than sixteen pages or been left out altogether.
Following Part II which is entitled "The Initiation of Proceedings" and
vhich contains, among other things, a discussion of jurisdiction and venue
problems the editor abruptly interrupts the development of procedure, in order,
in Part III, to devote some 400 pages to substantive law. To avoid produc-
ing two casebooks bound in one volume the author chose to split the one topic
and insert the other in the cleft. Thus he "integrates" the two subjects-the
way oil and water are integrated when poured together. Since these are
1. CuMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL R=CONsmRucrIoN (1946).
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fundamentally different topics which just won't mix, it makes little difference
where the split occurs. Mr. Dession's choice would seem as good (or as bad)
as any other. By passing over Part III temporarily, one finds exactly as he
would wish and expect, that, having just finished with the prosecuting at-
torney (Chapter VII), he is now (Chapter XIII) introduced to defense coun-
sel, with no 400 page gap blurring the sequence. The chapter not only has
adequate material dealing with the very live question of what is contained
within the constitutional right to have counsel; it also contains admirable se-
lections on the duties of defense counsel and on the limits set by proper pro-
fessional ethics.
Chapter XIV on "Proceedings before Magistrates" seems seriously in-
adequate. It contains only three cases. One disposes of summary proceed-
ings and another of the whole field of bail. That leaves only one case on pre-
liminary examination.2 Students of criminal procedure are pretty well agreed
that a major source of our troubles lies in the inadequate attention that we
have been giving to this stage-one through which practically every criminal
proceeding must pass and which turns out to be the final one in so high a
proportion of them. It is a matter for surprise and regret that Mr. Dession
appears so fully to support its rejection from real consideration.
Chapter XV, on "Indictment and Information" has no case material, but
only the Federal Rules and comment on them and the text of an information
in a Sherman Act violation with comment. It is a relief to find that Mr. Des-
sion has swept out the lumber of indictment minutiae.
Chapter XVI, "Arraignment and Preliminaries to Trial," really deserves
only the latter half of its title. It contains interesting selections on extradition,
suppression prior to indictment of an involuntary confession, subpoenas, dis-
covery and inspection; but unfortunately, there is little or nothing on the
meaning or scope of the various pleas or on motions to quash.
Chapter XVII covers the whole topic of Trial, from the selection of the
jury to the reception of the verdict. In an extreme form it raises a question
that, to some extent, will occur to the teachers throughout the book. In its
forty-eight pages there are only two cases.3 One of these deals with the
legality of blue-ribbon juries, the other with comment on the defendant's fail-
ure to take the stand. They can scarcely be regarded as "covering" the whole
field of trial. Of course there is much to be said for narrowing and intensify-
ing the field of discussion, but surely Mr. Dession has here carried matters
much too far. It is scant comfort that the notes refer to many other subjects4
falling within the trial area. It still remains true that this is not a casebook
in them. Incidentally the entire chapter (Chapter XVIII) on Judgment and
Appeal-two rather sizable topics-contains only one case.
We now return to Part III, which contains five chapters on substantive
law. The first of these deals with certain general principles and concepts,
such as the meaning of act, motive, causation, parties, attempt, etc. In it Mr.
2. Even this case is only doubtfully in point (to say the least), as it deals, not with
the examination, but with whether a plea of guilty, after indictment and later withdrawn
with the permission of the court, might be shown as an admission, at the trial. It is
difficult to see how a discussion of preliminary examination can be founded on it as its
basis. It should be added that there is a half-page note on defense counsel at this stage.
3. Ten of the forty-eight pages are used for the Federal Rules and brief notes. One
of the cases takes up twenty-one pages, the other, seventeen.
4. The half page of notes at the end of the chapter deals with comment on the
evidence by the judge, return of verdict, multiple defendants, conviction of lesser offense,
hung juries, the giving of instructions, jury as the judge of the law, sealed verdicts, una-
nimity, etc.
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Dession appears to have brought together a large amount of highly stimulating
material. Particularly noteworthy are the pages dealing with conspiracy and
with prior proceedings as a possible bar to later ones. Again the question
may be raised whether the cases are not too few and too long, with too much
space given to notes presenting text material.
The remaining four chapters on substantive offenses require little com-
ment. They appear, in the main, to be very well constructed. An occasional
doubt does suggest itself: is it wise to begin the treatment of larceny with the
Carrier's Case? It seems most strange to develop the complex superstructure
before the foundations are laid. Do treason and sedition really merit thirty-
six pages, in view of all the crimes that must be omitted almost entirely?
True, right now they loom large in our thoughts, but may we not hope that
this is a passing phase?
In conclusion a few general comments will be made. Mr. Dession has
elected to lean heavily on very recent material. Of the (approximately) 144
cases sixty-nine are dated 1930 or later. In a subject in which state law still
supposedly plays a major part, it is surprising to find that over 500 pages of
the total of 1052 fall in the federal category. While Mr. Dession in his
preface gives his reasons for this choice, it seems to be carried to an extreme,
especially when, for instance, in the twenty-two pages of the chapter on
Judgment and Appeal exactly twenty-two lines are assigned to state material,
And while the Federal Rules are of course important, it is a pity that the rare
references to the American Law Institute's Code are uniformly limited to
two or three lines merely stating that pertinent state decisions are collected
under such and such a section.
As to mechanical matters, the book has a good index-a feature too often
treated carelessly in casebooks. On the other hand it has two marks against
it: there is a complete absence of running heads at the top of the pages. In-
stead, from beginning to end the name of the book unhelpfully appears. And,
in a book dealing with criminal law, what justification is there for a table of
ases alphabetized by the plaintiff's name ("State," "People," etc., etc.) in-
stead of by that of the defendant? The inconvenience appears particularly
clearly in the English cases, which may be found under 'Rex," "Regina,"
"King," "Queen" and "The Queen."
ERNST W. PUTrKAMMER
Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1272
